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Abstract
This article examines sorne of the prob-
lems related to humanitarian interven-
tion in situations ofmass displacement.
Comparisons between the significant
resources spent on the conflict in the
former Yugosl(1via and the lesser re-
sources spent on other less-publicized
conflicts are used to illustrate the basic
unfairness regarding the selective na-
ture ofinternational interventions. Ex-
amples of local manipulation resulting
jram the politicization of the interven-
tion in Bosnia-Herzegovina are used to
further il1ustrate the complications that
may arise when intervention replaces
asylum in response to humanitarian
tragedies.
Précis
Cet article examine quelques problèmes
liés aux interventions humanitaires
dans des situations de déplacements
massifs. Les ressources considérables
qui ont été consacrées à l'intervention
dans l'ancienne Yougoslavie sont com-
parées aux ressources limitées qui sont
réservées pour d'autres conflits moins
médiatisés. Des exemples de manipula-
tions de la part des belligérants en
Bosnie-Herzégovine sont également
présentés pour illustrer les complica-
tions qui peuvent se développer quand
des solutions interventionistes sont
proposées pour remplacer l'asile en cas
de crise humanitaire.
This article focuses on two issues that
have characterized humanitarian in-
tervention in recent years: selectivity
and politicization. Although problems
related to selectivity and politicization
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are inherent to much of the United
Nations' activities, the extent to which
they have manifested themselves in
recent years is troublesome. The exam-
pIe of the UN involvement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina is used to demonstrate
the basic unfairness in the way limited
resources are spent worldwide and the
complications that can arise when the
international community attempts to
lead an impartial humanitarian opera-
tion in a region tom by internaI armed
conflict.
It is important to note that recent
examples of humanitarian interven-
tion have occurred in a period when
states are coordinating their efforts in
order to close their borders to potential
asylum seekers. Along with facilitat-
ing the containment of refugee flows,
humanitarian intervention and the ac-
companying principal relief aid role
reserved for the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees can be
advantageous for maI1Y states in that it
relegates refugee protection to the
weaker aspect of the 1951 Refugee
Convention's protection regime: insti-
tutional emergency assistance by
UNHCR. This form of assistance is less
threatening to states since it avoids the
legal obligations associated with tlle
granting of asylum. The ad hoc and dis-
cretionary nature of UNHCR's emer-
gency assistance are particularly
attractive in a period characterized by
diminishing commitments to asylum
and a new emphasis on addressing the
"root causes" of refugee flows.
Selectivity of Interventions in Cases
of Refugee Outflow
There are cases when the violence and
humanitarian crisis surrounding dis-
placement achieve so much visibility
that the international community is
forced to intervene militarily. The
mass displacement of Kurds in Iraq
following the Gulf War was such a
case. With the brutal application of
non-admission measures at the Turk-
ish border, the international news me-
dia's coverage of the Kurds' plight
compelled Western states to provide a
form of in-country protection that was
designed to avoid further regional
destabilization. The fact that the gov-
ernment of Iraq had justbeen defeated
militarily made it possible for the West
to bypass strict state sovereignty in
order to protect the Kurds. These vic-
tims of displacement thus benefited
from the establishment of a "safe ha-
ven" which was intended to eliminate
their reasons for fleeing. It is important
to note that the UN Security Council
declared that the threat to interna-
tional peace and security resulted from
the regionally destabilizing refugee
flow and not the human rights viola-
tions which prompted victims to flee. 1
Several months after the slaughter and
mass displacement had begun in
Rwanda during the Spring of 1994, the
Security Council's declaration that the
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis
constituted a threat to peace and secu-
rity in the region allowed a military
intervention by France in order to cre-
ate a "safe haven" in the southwestern
part of the country.2 Similarly, the Se-
curity Council's declaration that the
situation in Haiti constituted a threat
to peace and security in the region was
followed by an authorization to have a
multinational military force led by the
United States intervene while asylum
seekers were effectivelyprevented
from escaping to the US.3
Since these interventions were aIl
intimately linked to re~ugee flows, it
may seem understandable that
UNHCR was given an important (al-
though varying) role in each of them.
However, it should be remembered
that UNHCR's original role regarding
Refuge, Vol. 15, No. 3 (June 1996)'
international refugee protection did
not comprise an interventionist aspect
since the agency was supposed to de-
fend the asylum conditions of refugees
in host states. The interest in humani-
tarian intervention following the end
of the Cold War has changed this tradi-
tional approach to refugee protection.
Most importantly, the discretionary
nature of UNHCR's in-country emer-
gency assistance has always resulted
in the differentiated treatment of the
world's refugees. The practice of ear-
marking contributions to UNHCR has
led to situations where certain hu-
manitarian operations that attract suf-
ficient attentionhave been weIl funded
while others go unnoticed and remain
short of funds.4 Whether the attention
is accorded because of international
sympathy generated by the news me-
dia or more direct state interests, the
selectivity inherent to earmarked vol-
untary contributions assures UNH-
CR's dependence and vulnerability in
relation to the financing states.
In the present context of limited and
selective interventions, it is nat sur-
prising that the former Yugoslavia's
geographic location makes it pertinent
to the interests of the states that control
UNHCR. Reports of widespread hu-
man rights violations in Bosnia-Herze-
govina have also assured that the
victimized civilian populations re-
main the object of considerable inter-
national sympathy. Consequently,
UNHCR has received substantial
funding for this particular interven-
tion. In fact, expenditures in the former
Yugoslavia have been greatly dispro-
portionate in comparison to expendi-
tures for the entire African continent.
In 1992, the funds allocated to the op-
eration in the former Yugoslavia
(US$296,518,600) were almost as much
as the funds spent on aIl the programs
for the African continent (US$298,
169,900). In 1993, expenditures in the
former Yugoslavia (US$532,640,000)
were greater than expenditures for
Africa (US$325,141,000), and East Asia
and Oceania (US$144,397,600) com-
bined.5 Unfaimess resulting from the
selectivity of UNHCR's emergency
assistance has meant that once again
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European human rights victims re-
ceive more attention than a much
larger group of African victims. At the
end of 1993, 5,825,000 refugees and
asylum seekers were in need of protec-
tion or assistance in Africa. A further
16,890,000 individuaIs were displaced
within their African states. The former
Yugoslavia, on the other hand, had
generated approximately 1,319,650
refugees and 1,650,000 internally dis-
placed civilians.6 The UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees has quite
appropriately warned that the legiti-
macy of UN operations suffers as a re-
suIt of this kind of differentiated
treatment:
1must express my strong preoccupa-
tion at a refugee situation which is
draining precious financial and hu-
man resources desperately needed in
other parts of the world, mainly Af-
rica and Asia. It would be remiss of
me not to point out the crying needs
in poorer parts of the world which
are being overshadowed by the refu-
gees from ex-Yugoslavia?
Non-UN agencies such as the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross
provide a good example of a more
balanced approach to various global
operational requirements: in 1992,
ICRC activities in Africa were evalu-
ated at 393,600,000CHF while activi-.
ties in Europe (former Yugoslavia and
ex-Soviet Union) were evaluated at
120,600,000CHF.8 It was only after
several years of operations in the
former Yugoslavia that UNHCRestab-
lished a more reasonable balance in
relation to the limited resources avail-
able worldwide. In 1994, UNHCR ex-
penditures in the former Yugoslavia
amounted to US$226,524,800 while its
expenditures in Africa amounted to
US$506,090,900.9
The recent interest in promoting
humanitarian interventions and the
accompanying principal humanitar-
ian aid role reserved for UNHCR will
likely result in greater unfairness due
to the selectivity of these operations.
As refugees around the world increas-
ingly lose the ability to seek asylum
autonomously, the ad hoc and discre-
tionary nature of institutional re-
sponses to displacement increase the
risk that groups of coerced migrants
will be left abandoned by the interna-
tional community in situations where
both asylum and intervention are not
forthcoming. This tendency can only
be avoided in the unlikely event that
states increase their commitment to
humanitarian interventions.
It is also unlikely that the selective
concems and interests of states can be
reliably balanced by public pressure
which will encourage interventions
that are motivated by truly "humani-
tarian" concerns in remote parts of the
world. While public opinion can react
strongly when informed ofhumanitar-
ian tragedies, well-informed and unbi-
ased public with charitable intentions
are not easy to find. Technological im-
provements in communication sys-
tems do not assure an evenhanded and
comprehensive flow of information.
The influence of the international
news media and the distorted sense of
public awareness it has created can be
illustrated by comparing statistics on
recent international conflicts. The esti-
mated total number of war-related
deaths in Bosnia-Herzegovina is iden-
tical to the estimate regarding the con-
flict in Tajikistan (20,000-50,000).10 It is
also comparable to various less-
publicized conflicts around the world:
Aigeria since 1992 (10,000-25,000), Sri
Lanka since 1983 (>27,000), Liberia
(20,000), Peru since 1981 (>28,000),
Philippines since 1986 (21,000-25,000).
Even the prolonged conflict in Guate-
mala has produced comparable statis-
tics on total deaths «46,300). Yet these
other conflicts have received limited or
minimal international attention, while
conflicts with considerably more
casualties (e.g. Sudan, Angola) are un-
able to attract significant international
concerne It should be noted that
journalists and politicians regularly
used inflated figures for total war-
related deaths in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(200,000-250,000). Statistics for 1994
are particularly revealing: although
the year saw more war-related deaths
in Afghanistan (4,000-10,000), Yemen
(1,500-7,000) and Turkey (>3,000), it is
the relentless image of suffering in
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Perhaps the most outrageous attempts to influence international
public opinion involved orchestrated massacres offriendly
civilians who were sacrificed in order to blame the opposing side.
Bosnia-Herzegovina (>1,500 deaths)
that characterized much of the year's
journalistic coverage of international
conflict.
The portrayal of suffering in Bosnia-
Herzegovina remains accurate par-
ticularly to the extent that it depicts the
human rights violations that were as-
sociated with the brutal program of
orchestrated expulsions and deporta-
tions. Indeed, the statistics cited above
regarding displacement in the former
Yugoslavia indicate the extent to
which ethnic cleansing has been prac-
ticed over the last few years. For exam-
pIe, in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina
approximately 469,549 Muslims and
Croats have been driven from territory
controlled by the Serbs (out of a popu-
lation of Muslims and Croats that in-
cluded 536,549 before the war). In
eastern Bosnia and southern Herze-
govina, approximately 297,641 Mus-
lims and Croats have been forced to
flee their homes (there were 301,641
Muslims and Croats before the war).11
Yet mass displacement on more dis-
tant continents unfortunately has not
received a proportionate arnoun.t of
media coverage.12 Considerable popu-
lations of internally displaced persons
are fourld III Sudan (4,000,000), Angola
(2,000,000), Afghallistan (1,000,000)
Liberia (1,100,000), Sri Lanka (525,000),
Turkey (2,000,000) and Peru (600,000).
The number of refugees who have fled
their war-affected regions is equally
staggering: Afghanistan (2,835,000),
Liberia (784,000) and Sudan (510,000)
are but some of the examples. Since
many of the lesser known conflicts
barely get any coverage by the interna-
tional news media, Western govern-
ment leaders have not had to react to
public outrage regarding these hu-
manitarian tragedies as they have been
doing in relation to Bosnia-Herze-
govina since 1992.
Politicization of Interventions
within Refugee Producing
Countries
While selectivity can result in certain
humanitarian tragedies being ignored,
politicization continues' to complicate
those tragedies that manage to attract a
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forceful international response. In-
deed, relief aid delivered in the midst
of an internaI armed conflict can often
be perceived as a political gesture. It
should come as no surprise that it may
be contested by enernies of the benefi-
ciaries: "Increasingly, the UNHCRand
aid agencies must operate in the midst
of ongoing conflicts where even the
most humanitarian activities are per-
ceived by one or even aIl parties as a
factor affecting the outcome of the con-
frontation."13 This is why recent exam-
pIes of intervention have been
challenged by local belligerents who
want to prevent international aid from
reaching their enemies. It is often diffi-
cult for external actors to maintain the
fiction of impartiality in these situa-
tions of intervention.
The UN involvement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina furtller highlights tlle
cruel consequences of the politiciza-
tion of interventions in that it has been
confronted with numerous incidents
which involve sacrificing civilian
populations for political goals. Early in
the conflict, UNPROFORcommanders
had remarked that sorne of the actors
were intentionally trying to interna-
tionalize the conflict in order ta obtain
a direct military intervention from
which they expected to benefit.14 In re-
lation to this effort to intemationalize
the conflict, UNPROFOR and UNHCR
officiaIs have correctly noted that the
"CNN front" played an important role
during the war.15 The international
news media was used in order to gen-
erate public sympathy for sorne of the
actors in the conflict. Although using
the media to influence events is not
necessarily objectionable, it can be-
come problematic when genuinely
objective information is replaced by
propaganda emanating from one side
in a civil warD
As reported by the UN Secretary
General on several occasions, military
pro\:,ocations which resulted in dispro-
portionate responses were a frequent
tactic throughout the warD In fact, the
actual siege of Sarajevo only began af-
ter Yugoslav Army (JNA) barracks in
the city were blockaded. When a sup-
posedly negotiated evacuation of one
of these barracks was interrupted by
an ambush in which several JNA offic-
ers were shot dead and 200 JNA sol-
diers were taken prisoner, the canons
positioned around the city were used
to retaliate and begin the long cam-
paign of terror which was intended to
subdue the local population.l7 The
CNN effect and the international pub-
lic outrage resulting from artillery
shells exploding in an urban centre
proved to be too attractiveto the city's
political leaders who had promised
before the outbreak of hostilities that
JNA barracks would not be blockaded
as they were in Croatia and Slovenia.18
The bombardments of Bosnia-Herze-
govina's capital city that followed as-
sured that television teams could
broadcast startling war images around
the world.
Perhaps the most outrageous at-
ternpts ta influence international pub-
lic opinion involved orchestrated
massacres of friendly civilians who
were sacrificed in order to blame the
opposing side. These incidents are par-
ticularly troublesome because they
appear to have been effective in
achieving the desired result: mobiliz-
ing public opinion into pressuring
governments to take action against one
of the parties to the conflict.
One of the most publicized events
occurred in May 1992 when two mor-
tar shells killed seventeen people who
were waiting outside a bakery located
in a Muslim-controlled part of Sara-
jevo:
The pressure for some form of action
to stop the fighting in BiH was grow-
ing among the international public,
not just in the West but in Islamic
countries as welle One of the turning
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points was the shelling of a bread
queue in Sarajevo in the middle of
May. The resulting carnage was re-
corded on possiblythe most nauseat-
ing television footage of the war. In
London at the time, 1observed how
entire news rooms stopped what
they were doing and stared in deep
shock at the pictures coming over the
satellite feed ... [T]his war has con-
firmed that the influence of print or
radio journalism is negligible when
compared with the impact that a few
minutes of video can have. The Serb
forces around Sarajevo denied more
vigorously than usual that they were
responsible for the outrage. Instead,
they insisted that Bosnian govern-
ment forces had slaughtered their
own people precisely in order to gen-
erate the effect which the incident
provoked around the world.19
While the Serbs were effectively
blamed by the international news me-
dia for the attack, information was
eventually revealed indicating that the
Muslims had organized the massacre
in order to attribute responsibility to
the Serbs.20 Three days after the inci-
dent, the UN Security Council im-
posed sanctions against Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro). There are
also serious allegations that the Mus-
lims were responsible for the Markale
market massacre in Sarajevo in Febru-
ary 1994 that was attributed to the
Serbs and led to a NATO ultimatum.21
This, of course, does not exculpate the
Serbs (or otherbelligerents) who delib-
erately and openlybombarded civilian
targets: for example, when NATO air-
craft bombarded two Serb ammuni-
tion depots on May 25, 1995, the Serbs
retaliated with their canons and killed
seventy-one civilians in Tuzla.22 It
does, however, indicate the complexi-
ties involved in having an interna-
tional news media using its influence
to openly encourage armed interven-
tion in internaI conflicts where civil-
ians are being sacrificed by aIl sides.23
It should not be forgotten that an
UNPROFOR commander could not
complete his mandatebecause ofdeath
threats he received after trying to de-
nounce these types of manipulationby
the warring parties.24 The silence of the
media regarding this manipulation of
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public opinion is particularlynotewor-
thy if one considers that it was impos-
sible to travel in the region without
hearing rumours from UN personnel
concerning massacres staged for tel-
evision. Whether one considers the
examples of snipers shooting at their
own civilians in downtown Sarajev025
or bombardments of the Sarajevo air-
port staged by the city's authorities,26
it should be understood that forming
an accurate and nuanced picture of a
distant conflict is hard to do from jour-
nalistic sources.
The fact that there have also been a
considerable number of Serb victims
in Bosnia-Herzegovina is striking if we
consider that until the summer of 1995,
the Muslims (and occasionally the
Croats) were generally presented by
the international news media as the
only victims of ethnic cleansing.27 This
perception persisted despite the fact
that since mid-1993 most of the offen-
sives in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been
mounted by the Muslim forces (who,
according to sorne American politi-
cians, did not even have the weapons
to defend themselves).28 Even if the
Serbs were not able to militarily defeat
the Muslim forces in certain key areas
(Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Gorazde,
Brcko) it is the Serb terror inflicted on
besieged civilian populations that-
caught the attention of the interna-
tional community. The ensuing jour-
nalistic encouragement for a military
solution was so effective that the pub-
lic debate in the US focused on lifting
the UN arms embargo imposed on the
former Yugoslavia. Although the em-
bargo was not being respected by sev-
eral UN member states and the
Muslims were obtaining impressive
quantities of armaments,29 the pro-
posaI circulating in journalistic and
academic circles included a partial lift-
ing of the embargo that would benefit
the warring party that was generally
perceived as the main victim. Eventu-
ally, American politicians were no
longer hiding that they wanted to
openly finance and arm the Muslims.30
The manipulation and international
encouragement for a military solution
to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina
reached a point where the emboldened
Muslim forces decided it was not in
their interest to allow the complete
deployment of a more robust UN force
(Rapid Reaction Force) that was sup-
posed to protect their own civilian
populations.31
It is useful to keep in mind that
internaI armed conflicts are rarely less
complicated than the one in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In these highly politi-
cized scenarios within countries of
origin, affluent states are financing a
.supposedly "non-political" UNHCR32
so that it may engage in interventionist
activities. Supported by UN military
,personnel with vaguely defined hu-
manitarian roles, refugee protection is
consequently reduced to emergency
relief in war zones where manipula-
tions and discredit can often be ex-
pected. In a sense, refugee law's
contribution to intemationallaw is re-
placed by protection concerns that are
part of humanitarian law. Yet for most
victims of displacement, even the
forceful interventions remain illusory
in a system characterized by selective
concerne The many problems associ-
ated with humanitarian intervention
suggest that its use in relation to refu-
gee outflows cannot be a reliable pro-
tection alternative to asylum...
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